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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
TODD S. AAGAARD*
IN 1971, Ferdinand Fernandez published a short article entitled Due Pro-cess and Pollution: The Right to a Remedy in Volume 16 of the Villanova Law
Review.1  On the occasion of the Law Review’s sixtieth anniversary, as I re-
viewed past volumes looking for articles focused on my primary area of
scholarly interest—environmental law—Fernandez’s article piqued my in-
terest for several reasons.
First, Fernandez published the article in 1971, at the advent of mod-
ern American environmental law.  Fernandez presumably wrote his article
in 1970, perhaps the most important and formative year in the history of
environmental law.  That year, the National Environmental Policy Act be-
came law, President Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency,
and twenty million Americans participated in the first Earth Day.2  The
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act quickly followed, in 1971 and 1972,
respectively.3  Although the roots of environmental law extend well back
into the nineteenth century, the early 1970s effectuated a revolution that
formed the modern field of environmental law as we now know it and
created the foundation for much of what constitutes the field now, more
than forty-five years later.4
Second, Fernandez’s article, although brief, grapples with a funda-
mental, existential question for environmental law: what kind of legal
framework should be used to effectuate environmental protection?  Al-
though such questions continue to arise in environmental law, in the early
1970s they were especially significant as environmental law was being cre-
ated on a relatively blank slate.  A topic that might now strike some as
appropriate merely for academic musings was at the time very much an
open question relevant to the practicing bar.
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law.
1. Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Due Process and Pollution: The Right to a Remedy, 16
VILL. L. REV. 789 (1971).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012); see also Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35
Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app.); Denis Hayes,
Environmental Law and Millennial Politics, 25 ENVTL. L. 953, 954 (1995).
3. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2012).
4. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinven-
tion: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999); see also
Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717, 720
(2007); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of
Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459
(1996). See generally Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environ-
mental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1137–60 (2010).
(385)
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Third, Fernandez was an attorney in private practice in California at
the time he wrote the article, but would go on to become a federal district
court judge and, subsequently, a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.  Thus, Due Process and Pollution reflects the ruminations of someone
very much interested and actively involved in the creation of law.  Al-
though Fernandez addressed his article to a topic of scholarly interest, he
wrote it from a very pragmatic perspective.
I. DUE PROCESS AND POLLUTION
Due Process and Pollution is not lengthy, and its line of argument is
relatively easy to summarize.  Fernandez started with a strong call to action
against environmental threats: “[A]ssaults have been made upon air and
water . . . .  The earth is reeling from attacks by [various forms of pollu-
tion].”5  Natural resources “are being ravaged and destroyed.”6
Fernandez then moved quickly from arguing for the importance of
redressing environmental harms to the question of what the law could do
to help.7  He identified three potential sources of legal framework for en-
vironmental protection: common law, legislation and regulation, and the
U.S. Constitution.
Of these three options, Fernandez was most skeptical—dismissive,
even—of legislation and regulation.  This skepticism was apparently not
confined to the environmental realm, but extended generally to all legisla-
tion and regulation: “Unfortunately, it is often ingenuous to place one’s
hope in the legislative process, since legislators are subjected to lobbying
pressures and often find it necessary to compromise and avoid enacting
real solutions.  Executive enforcement, likewise, has often been rather
lax.”8
Having rejected legislation, Fernandez was only slightly more optimis-
tic about using common law to prevent or redress environmental harms.
“Many of the rules and approaches” in the common law, he argued, “seem
to present almost insurmountable obstacles.”9  Balancing tests used to de-
fine tort duties “put[ ] the little person at the mercy of the more power-
ful.”10  Latent injuries that do not manifest until long after exposure pose
problems for proving causation and damages.11  Fernandez argued, how-
ever, that tort law could be reformed to accommodate more effective
5. Fernandez, supra note 1, at 789 (footnotes omitted).
6. Id. at 790.
7. See id. at 791 (noting potential destructive harm of pollution and stating
“The question is: What can be done about it?”).
8. Id. (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 792.
10. Id. at 794–95; see also id. at 792 (describing negligence as “an illusory rem-
edy because of the kind of balancing test used in defining duty”).
11. See id. at 792.
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causes of action against environmental harms, a position he pressed more
directly in a subsequent article.12
In contrast with his doubt about the value of statutory and common
law tools, Fernandez was most enthusiastic about using constitutional law
to address environmental harms.  The thesis of Due Process and Pollution
thus argued that constitutions, and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in particular, provide an attractive and viable frame-
work for environmental protection.  Due process, he argues,
requires each state (and the federal government when it has juris-
diction) to provide the people with remedies for injuries caused
to their persons or property by pollution, and that when the pol-
luting agent threatens to cause damage over a long period by
reason of its chronic presence, injunctive or some similar form of
relief must be provided.13
Central to Fernandez’s argument is the claim that due process applies
similarly to government action and government inaction, because “[t]he
act of withholding remedies constitutes state action  .  .  .  .”14  Fernandez
pointed to examples of cases in which courts have held that due process
protects against government actions that harm property.  “If taking, shift-
ing ownership of, and preventing owners’ use of property are all prohib-
ited [by due process], it should follow that removing the remedies which
protect the owners’ property interests is also prohibited.”15  In other
words, due process requires governments to protect people from
pollution.
II. THE DECLINE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Unfortunately for Fernandez’s thesis, substantive due process has
turned out to be much more limited than what he envisioned.  Supreme
Court precedent flatly rejects his position that due process imposes on
governments an affirmative duty to protect persons from injuries caused
by private third-party conduct.  In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services,16 the Court held that “nothing in the language of the Due
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.  The Clause is
phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security.”17  If due process does not
impose a duty to protect, it would seem that Fernandez’s thesis fails.
12. See id. at 794–95; see also Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Pollution and the Law of
Public and Private Nuisance, 11 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J. 47 (1972).
13. Fernandez, supra note 1, at 796.
14. Id. at 797–98.
15. Id. at 800.
16. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
17. Id. at 195.
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III. THE DIFFICULTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS
Environmental torts have fared somewhat better than constitutional
remedies for environmental harms, but also have not developed into the
robust tool of environmental protection that Fernandez advocated in
1971.  Balancing continues to lead to relatively weak duties.18  Plaintiffs
find it difficult or impossible to demonstrate causation for their injuries
when pollution comes from numerous diverse sources and exposure oc-
curs over lengthy periods.19  Where environmental legislation has been
enacted, courts have often held that it displaces common law remedies.20
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY STATE
Meanwhile, as substantive due process withered and environmental
torts failed to meet Fernandez’s expansive prescriptions, environmental
legislation and regulation proliferated.  Federal environmental statutes oc-
cupy thousands of pages of the United States Code and regulate every
sector of the contemporary economy.  These statutes save hundreds of
thousands of lives and generate billions of dollars in economic benefits.21
The Environmental Protection Agency, the lead federal environmental
agency, has developed into a sophisticated regulatory and enforcement
body.  Polluters who violate environmental standards often pay steep civil
penalties and sometimes face substantial prison terms.  Even if our envi-
ronmental statutes are far from perfectly effective—pollution still threat-
ens public health and welfare—they are undoubtedly the strongest legal
tool available to protect the environment.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, FORTY-FIVE YEARS LATER
Due Process and Pollution is interesting because it reflects a time in
which, in the infancy of federal environmental law and when a broad bi-
partisan consensus supported increased environmental protection, it
seemed that all options were on the table.  In addition to the strong mo-
mentum in favor of environmental law, the expansiveness of constitutional
protections at the time made constitutionalizing environmental protection
seem much more viable than it seems now.  Doctrinal flexibility in tort also
18. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What’s
Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1559 (1991).
19. See id. at 1556–59.
20. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (holding
that Clean Air Act displaces federal common law cause of action to abate carbon
dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants); see also City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314, 332 (1981) (holding that Clean Water Act displaces
common law nuisance claim for water pollutant discharges).
21. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENE-
FITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (2011), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_
a.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAL4-5HTD].
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made common law protections seem more realistic than they have turned
out to be.
Forty-five years later, the common law and constitutional due process
have played a far weaker role in environmental protection than Fernandez
envisioned in 1971.  Instead, legislation and regulation have come to dom-
inate the environmental law landscape.  Although this historical pathway
forecloses, at least for the foreseeable future, Fernandez’s argument for
the constitutionalization of environmental law, it raises its own deep ques-
tion for environmental law, and indeed for regulatory law more generally:
Was environmental law’s movement toward statutes and regulation inevita-
ble, or could environmental law have developed using primarily common
law or constitutional law?
I am tempted to think that environmental law’s legislative move was
inevitable and that legislation and regulation are inherently better suited
vehicles for environmental law than the common law and constitutional
doctrine.  Other areas of law illustrate the difficulty that would be encoun-
tered in constitutionalizing a right to environmental protection.  For ex-
ample, state constitutions contain an express right to a public education,
and many states attach qualitative descriptors, such as “suitable” or “ade-
quate,” to that right.22  Courts have generally been unwilling, however, to
find that poor-quality educational programs violate these constitutional
rights to a public education.23  Even where courts do find constitutional
violations of rights to public education, they tend to set broad goals and
allow the political branches to decide on an appropriate program, rather
than directing specific action.24  Thus, even where constitutional litigation
has been most successful in enforcing a right to a quality public education,
it has only created a structure for effectuating that right, and it has relied
on other institutions to create and implement the mechanisms to accom-
plish the goals set by the judiciary.
A similar pattern seems to have prevailed with a state constitutional
right to fair housing.  In the landmark 1975 case of Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,25 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a municipality’s power to zone under the New Jersey Con-
stitution carries a constitutional obligation to enact a zoning scheme that
creates a realistic opportunity for low—and moderate—income families to
22. See Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 719,
729 (2012).
23. See, e.g., Agostine v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 527 A.2d 193, 195 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1987) (“The mandate of Article III, Section 14 of our state Constitution does
not confer an individual right upon each student to a particular level or quality of
education but, instead, imposes a duty upon the legislature to provide for the main-
tenance of a thorough and efficient system of public school throughout the Com-
monwealth.” (footnote omitted)).
24. See Bauries, supra note 22, at 731; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015,
1026 (2004).
25. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
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find housing.  Although, at first impression, the Mount Laurel case may
seem to be a reason for optimism about constitutional litigation, the real-
ity is more sobering.  Other states have not followed New Jersey’s lead.26
Even within New Jersey, the Mount Laurel Doctrine has not resulted in sig-
nificant progress toward economic integration.27  As Peter Schuck has ob-
served, it appears that “[h]ousing markets . . . are too complex and
dynamic for courthouse engineering.”28
These examples could lead one to conclude that environmental is-
sues, education issues, and housing issues are fundamentally problems of
public policy that are ill-suited for resolution through common law and
constitutional litigation.  The balancing and tradeoffs that Fernandez
noted as a shortcoming in Due Process and Pollution are an inherent part of
these public policy problems.29  Legislatures and administrative agencies
seem to be better institutions for making the complex policy decisions that
balance competing goals in these areas.
That said, a recent development in Pennsylvania law may provide
some limited optimism for the vitality of Fernandez’s argument that con-
stitution-based environmental rights can be part of an effective legal
framework for environmental protection. Robinson Township v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania30 involved a challenge under the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution to Act 13, which regulates oil and gas operations. The
26. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLI-
CIES 1098 (2d ed. 2012) (“New Jersey’s experience with judicial remedies for exclu-
sionary zoning has been almost unique.”).
27. See, e.g., SARAH FLETCHER, CTR. ON LAW IN METRO. EQUITY, TOOTHLESS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF NEW JERSEY’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY (2015),
available at http://www.clime.newark.rutgers.edu/publications/report/toothless-
analysis-efficacy-new-jerseys-affordable-housing-policy [https://perma.cc/2QXY-
EMG3] (arguing that “enforcement of [the Mount Laurel Doctrine] has proven to
be nearly impossible”); see also Peter H. Schuck, Op-Ed., Bringing Diversity to the
Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/
08/opinion/08SCHU.html [https://perma.cc/N6BF-9PTB] (“[The Mount Laurel
Doctrine] has done little for low-income families.  Statewide, developers have built
almost 15 times more market-rate units than affordable units—and most of the
latter would probably have been built anyway.  The affordable units, moreover, are
disproportionately occupied by people of relatively high socioeconomic
status . . . .”).
28. See Schuck, supra note 27.
29. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Base-
lines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505, 1533 (2011) (“Tradeoffs between
conflicting uses [of environmental resources] . . . are an important animating
force in environmental decisionmaking.”); J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Af-
fordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 527, 529 (2007) (noting tradeoffs in housing policy); Daniel B. Rodri-
guez, The Political Question Doctrine in State Constitutional Law, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 573,
589 (2013) (noting that “[c]ourts can plausibly see tradeoffs before them; but they
are ill-equipped to make the kind of tradeoffs that move policy forward” and offer-
ing education finance as example of policy area in which this observation holds
true).
30. 83 A.3d 901 (2013).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Act 13, insofar as it preempted
some local regulation of oil and gas operations, violated the state constitu-
tion.31  A plurality of the court held that the statute violated the state’s
Environmental Rights Amendment, and Justice Baer, concurring in the
judgment, would have held that the statute violates substantive due
process.
Echoing Due Process and Pollution, both the plurality and Justice Baer’s
opinions express an obligation for government to protect landowners
from environmental harm.  Both opinions fault Act 13 for disabling local
governments’ authority to protect citizens from environmental harm
through local land use regulation.  Justice Baer’s opinion provides an ex-
ample of what due process protection for environmental concerns can
look like in a contemporary setting.  Justice Baer would have held that Act
13 violates substantive due process by usurping local municipalities’ duty
to impose and enforce community planning: “[M]eaningful protection of
the acknowledged substantive due process right of an adjoining land-
owner to quiet enjoyment of his real property can only be carried out at
the local level,” and disabling local regulation thus effects a violation of
substantive due process.32
Although Robinson Township and Due Process and Pollution similarly
oblige governments to protect landowners from environmental harm,
Robinson Township falls significantly short of fully endorsing the strong ju-
dicial role Fernandez envisioned.  Fernandez seems to have advocated a
substantive individual right to protection from pollution—for example, an
obligation whereby the government must protect against harmful ground-
water contamination. Robinson Township, by contrast, adopts a more struc-
tural approach that does not guarantee the individual any particular level
of environmental quality, but rather mandates a legal and institutional
structure conducive to protection of the individual from environmental
harm.  Unlike substantive individual rights, structural constitutional man-
dates can be seen as supporting, rather than supplanting, democratic de-
bate by giving discretion to the political branches to choose the
appropriate course of action within broad bounds set by the courts.  Struc-
tural mandates thereby respect the comparative institutional advantages of
the political branches over courts in resolving complex issues of public
policy.
That said, Robinson Township is not necessarily the clearest model for
constitutionalizing environmental protections.  In particular, the opinions
somewhat elide the distinction between a negative duty not to harm and
an affirmative duty to protect, as Fernandez did in Due Process and Pollution.
When a state legislature prevents a local government from regulating oil
and gas development, and as a result allows oil and gas development to
31. See id. at 1000 (“Sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 violate the
Environmental Rights Amendment [of Pennsylvania Constitution.]”).
32. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J., concurring).
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cause environmental harms against landowners, has the legislature acted
(by preventing local government from acting) or has government merely
failed to act to protect landowners?  What is the import of this?  Was Fer-
nandez correct back in 1971, that a robust constitutional duty to protect
against environmental harm can be an important tool of environmental
law, or is Robinson Township just inviting trouble?
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